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Summary 
Recent major spills on European coasts have highlighted the primary policy relevance 
for the EU of oil spills. This paper assesses the risks related to carrying oil to the EU 
along the route from the Russian Black Sea coast to Sicily, Italy (one of the most 
congested and strategically relevant European import routes). We develop a 
methodology based on Fault Tree Analysis, and we apply it to the most likely causes of 
an oil spill. We couple the resulting probabilities with data on expected spill size, types 
of oil carried and cleanup costs, to estimate expected costs for cleanup and loss of 
cargo. The route analysed appears to be a risky one; there is a “high” to “very high” risk 
of a spill along this route. The Turkish Straits turn out to be the major danger point; 
however, there is no obvious hierarchy amongst the other sites along the route. 
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1. Introduction 
Assessing the externalities related to the extraction and transport of oil has proven in the last decades 
an issue of primary policy relevance. Recent major spills such as the Erika on the French Atlantic 
coast and the Prestige on the north-western Spanish coast have meant that public and governmental 
attention is firmly focused on the issue of how to minimise the impact of such disasters. Given the 
predicted global increase in energy demand, securing Europe’s future energy needs will become of 
increasing geopolitical and strategic importance.  
In order to arrive at a comprehensive evaluation of the external costs associated to importing oil into 
Europe, one needs to take into account the likely future oil demand-supply scenarios, the relative 
relevance of import routes and pipelines, the local specificities in terms of critical passages, the 
differences in terms of burdens and environmental and socio-economic impacts along the different 
routes and pipelines, and the development of oil spills prevention and remediation technologies and 
regulations. Last but not least, the intrinsic stochastic nature of the phenomenon should be carefully 
analysed. The role of the perception by the European citizens of the risk involved in carrying oil to 
Europe and the role of the associated risk aversion are particularly important in this context. In order 
to incorporate all these features into a consistent evaluation framework, one needs to develop a 
methodology suitable to deal with probabilistic externalities. 
In this perspective, we address the issue of creating a methodology for analyzing the risks related to 
oil tanker accidents. A sample route from Novorossiysk on the Black Sea coast in Russia to Augusta 
in Sicily, Italy, is used as a benchmark to test the developments of this methodology. The basic 
scenario  considers  a  Suezmax  type  tanker  carrying  approximately  145’000  tonnes  of  oil  cargo. 
Tankers of this class are the most likely to be used along this route. The Bosphorus cannot be 
navigated by tankers larger than 150’000 tonnes; moreover, small tankers are unlikely to be used 
along this route due to recent European regulations which have banned tankers cruising under the 
flag of countries notorious for having lax regulatory criteria for registering ships – medium-sized and 
large tankers are unlikely to be operated under these flags.  
The  selected  route  has  a  number  of  special  features  which  make  it  of  singular  importance  and 
interest,  not  least  the  fact  that  it  passes  through  the  Bosphorus  Straits,  a  highly  congested  and 
navigationally difficult sea passage passing through the heart of Istanbul in Turkey. 
Four  locations  along  the  route  were  chosen  due  to  a  combination  of  the  high  likelihood  of  an 
accident  happening  in  that  particular  site  and  the  high  environmental  and  socio-economic 
consequences that such an accident would entail. The parts of the route not considered, through the 
Black Sea and from the Aegean to Sicily, not only have a lower chance of a spill occurring due to a   3 
relative lack of obstacles, but also should a spill occur the consequences would be, again relative to 
the other sites, less severe due to the absence of a nearby coastline and the fact that the oil would be 
naturally dispersed more quickly in the open sea. As a consequence their expected risk values are 
orders of magnitude lower than those of the selected sites. 
This paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the route under scrutiny. Section 3 
introduces and discusses the methodology used. Section 4 presents the main results and Section 5 
concludes.  
2. The Route  
2.1. Novorossiysk 
Novorossiysk is the largest port in Southern Russia and its oil terminal at Sheskhranis is responsible 
for over 50% of Russian crude oil exports by sea. There is a second terminal at Novorossiysk, the 
Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) new oil terminal at Yuzhniy Ozerejevka. Oil is predominantly 
pumped to the terminal from the Tengiz oilfield in Western Kazakhstan and oil fields in Azerbaijan. 
The CPC terminal is situated 5 km offshore in waters more than 50-metre deep and is located west of 
the Sheskhranis oil terminal. 
2.2. Turkish Straits 
By Turkish Straits is meant the passage from the Black Sea, through the Istanbul Strait (Bosphorus), 
the Sea of Marmara, and the Canakkale Strait (Dardanelles) into the Aegean Sea. It is the only sea 
route out of the Black Sea and as such the only sea route through which Russian and Caspian exports 
can reach the Mediterranean. 
The  Bosphorus  passes  through  the  heart  of  Istanbul,  Turkey’s  largest  city  with  a  population  of 
approximately 12 million. It is 31 km long and on average 0.8 nautical miles wide, though at its 
narrowest point it is only 660 metres wide. Depth varies from 35 to 12 metres and vessels passing 
through are required to make 12 course alterations, including one turn of 45° at the narrowest point 
and another turn of 80°. 
The Dardanelles is another waterway similar to the Bosphorus. It is 70 km long though it is not as 
narrow as the Bosphorus: its narrowest point is 1.5 km wide. The accident risk is therefore much 
lower as, firstly, it does not pass through the centre of a large city (reduced consequences) and 
secondly, the topology allows for a safer passage (reduced incident probability). As such, when 
referring to the Turkish Straits, a number of factors refer mainly to the Bosphorus, however, where 
appropriate, data for the Dardanelles have been included.   4 
Though a number of pipeline projects bypassing the Straits have been constructed or are being 
planned
1,  their  high  transport  costs  per  barrel  mean  that  oil  transport  by  tanker  through  the 
Bosphorus is still by far the preferred transport route for exporters. At present roughly 1.7 million 
barrels of oil per day (bpd) is moved through the Bosphorus. Predicted increases in Russian and 
Caspian  exports  mean  that  by  2010  another  2-3  million  bpd  could  be  added.  The  International 
Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that the Straits have a maximum capacity of 1.8 million bpd. 
The  Straits  are  classed  as  international  waters  and  as  such  Turkey  has  an  obligation  under  the 
Montreux Convention of 1936 to permit free transport for merchant traffic. At that time there were 
only approximately 17 vessel transits per day, weighing on average 13 tonnes and mostly carrying 
grain. Today there are over 130 vessel transits a day of which roughly 15% are oil tankers, often as 
big as 150’000 tonnes – the maximum size for the Turkish Straits. In addition to this 1.5 million 
people commute from one side of the Bosphorus to the other each day, which makes it one of the 
busiest waterways in the world. 
Despite Russian opposition, Turkey unilaterally implemented certain traffic regulations in the Straits 
following an accident in 1994, with the aim of enhancing the navigational and environmental safety 
and security in the Straits which at that time already had a dense level of traffic. In 1998 Turkey 
introduced  further  regulations  governing  vessel  flow  through  the  Straits  including  a  five-fold 
increase in passage tariffs to help pay for ship safety measures. Both the regulations in 1994 and 
1998 were supported by the United Nations International Maritime Organisation (IMO). Turkey has 
also  recently  completed  installation  of  a  new  vessel  tracking  System  (VTS)  which  should  help 
further reduce the risk of accidents. 
2.3. Aegean Sea 
The Aegean Sea is located between the coasts of Greece and Turkey and the islands of Crete and 
Rhodes.  It  covers  an  area  of  210  square  kilometres  and  contains  over  two  thousand  islands  of 
varying sizes, most of which belong to Greece. The Aegean is also filled with submerged rocks and 
island populations that depend on fishing and tourism for their livelihood. It has been named as a key 
area of the Mediterranean in need of protection by the World Wildlife Fund. 
This area of the Mediterranean has a massive amount of tanker traffic, as it is here that tankers 
travelling from the Black Sea and the Suez canal converge, increasing the likelihood of a collision. 
                                                 
1 On 9
th November 2005, a project for a new bypass pipeline between Samsun (on the Black Sea) and Ceyhan (on the 
Mediterranean) was announced. Once realised, this pipeline will substantially relieve (by removing 1million bpd from 
the Turkish Straits traffic) but not completely solve the problem, if the projections of sustained demand growth for 
Russian and Caspian oil prove correct.    5 
2.4. Augusta 
The port of Augusta in Sicily is the third largest in Italy after Trieste and Genoa in terms of oil 
imports. It can handle tankers of up to 385000 dwt and serves the ISAB refinery, Italy’s second 
largest. The port is situated in the Marina di Melilli between Siracusa and Augusta. The area is one 
often frequented by tourists most of the year, and there is a nature reserve on the coast just south of 
the port. In 2003, 31 million tonnes of oil were imported through Augusta.  
3. Methodology  
The risk analysis proceeds via the following framework pathway. 
 
Figure 1. Outline of risk analysis methodology 
 
3.1. Stage 1. Causes and probabilities of oil spills 
The first task is to identify the possible causes of an oil spill. Ship-related oil pollution is attributed 
mostly  to  operational  discharges  which  have  consistently  overshadowed  accidental  discharges. 
Apparently the majority of these discharges happen either close to the mainland or within port areas 
and terminal stations resulting usually in small spills which are dealt with by the local authorities and 
are seldom reported. Less frequently, the cause of an oil spill from a tanker is an accidental event. 
The most likely causes of accidental oil spills are grounding and ship to ship collision. Fire and 
explosion used to be significant causes of accident. Their importance is now negligible, due to recent 
changes in unloading regulations that prevent the formation of explosive gas mixtures in the hull. 
Structural failures, foundering and loading-unloading errors can also cause sizeable spills; in these 
cases the human element, which can play a role also in case of grounding and collision is particularly 
important. 
The rest of this paper focuses on groundings and collisions as these are the two most likely sources 
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Stage 1  Stage 3  Stage 2  Result   6 
The probabilities of a grounding or collision incident occurring and causing oil to be spilled are 
calculated via Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). The probabilities were calculated using data from Brown
2 
using human error performance values under various situations and previous oil spill statistics. 
The Fault Trees in the Appendix show the possible accident trajectory of opportunity which could 
lead  to  an  oil  spill,  and  standard  probabilities  were  attributed  to  the  initiator  events.  These  are 
combined using Boolean algebra techniques. If, for an event to occur, two or more causal events 
need to happen (or not happen as the case may be), then the probabilities of these two events are 
multiplied  together.  This  new  value  gives  the  probability  of  each  events  occurring,  commonly 
known in Boolean algebra as the intersect of events. This is represented by an AND gate in the Fault 
Tree. For example, in the Fault tree for grounding in the Appendix, for drift grounding to occur, four 
events must happen simultaneously:  
1.  There is a loss of steering or propulsion. 
2.  There is an anchor failure. 
3.  There is a failure in the ability of assistance to prevent the grounding. 
4.  There is an unsafe wind or current which propels the vessel into a place where it grounds. 
Only if all of these factors occur at the same time will grounding occur. 
If, on the other hand, for an event to occur only one of any number of casual events is required for an 
event to occur, these probabilities are added together. In Boolean algebra this is the union of events
3 
and is represented by an OR gate.  
For there to be a failure of assistance to prevent grounding, any one of these events is sufficient. 
1.  Assistance is not requested. 
2.  Assistance does not arrive. 
3.  Assistance unable to prevent grounding. 
For the sake of simplicity, where there is a pathway that is far more important (difference is more 
than two orders of magnitude) than the others where only one is necessary (OR gate), only that 
pathway is considered. These probabilities are per tanker passage. 
These probabilities are then multiplied by the site-specific weightings which are listed in Table 1. 
The weightings take into account the physical variations between the sites. For example, the chance 
of assistance not arriving in the Bosphorus is a lot lower than it is for the Aegean. This is because the 
Bosphorus is very highly monitored and there is plenty of assistance available along it. The Aegean 
                                                 
2 [25] 
3 To be precise, the union is the sum of the probabilities minus the probability that the events occur simultaneously 
(intersect). As the probabilities used in this analysis were quite small, the intersect was negligible and therefore not 
considered.   7 
on the other hand is very large, less well monitored and assistance is more scattered. The Aegean 
therefore has a higher weighting factor for this event than the Bosphorus. 
The pathways in the fault trees in the Appendix which are coloured light blue from the initiating 
event through to the grounding/collision occurring are generic faults which are independent of the 
location, i.e. they could happen anywhere along the route. Elements shaded in grey have a site-
specific weighting and as such shall be different for each location. The probability values on the 
fault tree will be multiplied by the factors in the following Table to give the relative site probability 
of this accident trajectory of opportunity.  
 
Factor  Novorossiysk  Turkish Straits  Aegean Sea  Augusta 
w1s  Assistance unable to help  2  4  1  1 
w2s  Non Arrival of Assistance  2  1  4  1 
w3s  Desired track unsafe  4  5  2  4 
w4s  Grounding obstacle  4  5  1  4 
w5s  Other vessel  3  5  2  3 
w6s  Vision impairment  3  4  1  1 
w7s  Erroneous/untimely action  1  3  1  1 
w8s  Bad weather/currents  2  4  1  1 
w9s  Manoeuvre not possible  3  4  1  3 
hs  Passage Time (hours)  8  20  100  8 
Table 1. Site specific factor weighting 
Where:   
1 = No increased risk  4 = High increased risk 
2 = Slight increased risk  5 = Acute increased risk 
3 = Medium increased risk   
 
Combining FTA with site-specific weightings according to Equations (1) to (4) below, leads to the 
probabilities  of  an  accident  occurring  as  at  the  four  selected  locations  follows.  The  computed 
probabilities are reported in Table 2. 
 
P(Collision) = 
w5s * P(vessel in erroneous position) * w9s * 
 P(Manoeuvre not possible) + w7s * P(Remedial action not taken) + P(Error not detected)  (1) 
 
P(Grounding) = P(Drift Grounding) + P(Powered Grounding)          (2)   8 
 Where: 
P(Drift Grounding) = 
hs*P(Lost  Steering/Propulsion)*P(Anchor  Failure)*[P(assistance  not  requested)+w2s* 
P(Assistance does not arrive)+w1s*(Assistance unable to help)]*w8s *P(Unsafe wind/Currents    (3); 
 
P(Powered Grounding) = 
P(Course Leaves Desired Track)+w3s*P(Desired Track Unsafe )      (4) 
 
Location  Grounding  Collision 
  Computation  Result  Computation  Result 
Novorossiysk 
 
[8 * 8.4E-4 * 0.25 * (0.1 + 2 * 0.1 + 2 * 
0.1) * 2 * 0.01]+[ 1 * 1.95E-4 + 4.11E-5 + 
4 * 2,371E-4 * 3 * 0.01] 
 1.68E-4 + 
2.65E-4 = 
4.33E-4 
3 * 2,371E-4 * 3 * 0.01 + 




[20 * 8.4E-4 * 0.25 * (0.1 + 4 * 0.1 + 1 * 
0.1) * 4 * 0.01]+[ 3 * 1.95E-4 * 0.9999 + 




5 * 2,371E-4 * 4 * 0.01 + 
1.95E-4 + 4.11E-5 
2.84E-4 
Aegean Sea  [100 * 8.4E-4 * 0.25 * (0.1 + 1 * 0.1 + 4 * 
0.1) * 1 * 0.01] +[1 * 1.95E-4 * 0.9999 + 




1 * 2,371E-4 * 1 * 0.01 + 
1.95E-4 + 4.11E-5 
2.38E-4 
Augusta  [8 * 8.4E-4 * 0.25 * (0.1 + 1 * 0.1 + 1 * 
0.1) * 1 * 0.01] + [1 * 1.95E-4 * 0.9999 + 




3 * 2,371E-4 * 3 * 0.01 + 
1.95E-4 + 4.11E-5 
5.04E-6 
Table 2. Probability computations for Grounding and Collision. 
Two  calculations  were  made  for  each  site,  the  probability  of  a  spill  occurring  and  being  of  an 
Average size and the probability of a “Worst Case Scenario”.   
A Worst Case Scenario is defined as 90% of cargo is lost (spill size =130’000 tonne) and cargo is 
100% crude oil. 
The probable spill size and the likelihood that an incident came under the Worst Case Scenario 
category were taken from statistics of previous tanker accidents. The probability that, once an oil 
spill has occurred, it results in a Worst Case Scenario, is computed as follows: (from Table 4): 
 
P(>100’000 tonnes spilt) = Expected value * 0.02 grounding  OR  0.01 collision      (5) 
 
The fact that not every grounding or collision which occurs causes a spill is then also taken into 
account (Table 3).   9 
3.2. Stage 2. Oil outflow assessment. 
Once  the  probabilities  of  each  initiator  event  have  been  established,  they  are  multiplied  by  a 
weighting factor for each site, usually based on the physical characteristics, preventive measures and 
level of spill preparedness of the location. This allows us to determine: 
1.  given that grounding or a collision has occurred, the probability that oil is spilt, and then, 
2.  given that oil is lost, the probabilities of different amounts of oil being spilt. 
From 1993, all new tankers above 5’000 dwt were required to have double hulls or equivalent. 39% 
of all tankers had double hulls in 2001.
4 A report commissioned in the US after the Exxon Valdez 
disaster in Alaska showed that double-hull designs reduced the number of spills (over the single-
hulls) by 54 percent for the 150’000-dwt tankers. However in collisions, the double-hull vessels had 
a larger average spill size (given a spill) than the single-hulls, but the single-hulls had a larger 
maximum spill. For the grounding scenarios, in comparing average spill size given a spill, the single-
hull vessel had a larger average spill than the double-hull in the 150’000-dwt size. The double-hull 
designs had a larger maximum spill than the single-hulls.
5 
 
Cargo Spill Probability   Ship Size (dwt) 
Collision  Grounding 












0 – 2,000  0.52  0.364  0.19  0.171  0.45916  0.18259 
2,000–5,000  0.56  0.392  0.19  0.171  0.49448  0.18259 
5,000–20,000  0.24  0.168  0.35  0.315  0.21192  0.33635 
20,000 – 50,000  0.24  0.168  0.35  0.315  0.21192  0.33635 
> 50,000  0.31  0.217  0.39  0.351  0.27373  0.37479 
Average  0.39  0.273  0.3  0.27  0.34437  0.2883 
Table 3. Spill probabilities for oil tanker collisions and groundings (data 1980 - 1995)
6 
 
Table 3 calculates the probability of a tanker collision or grounding provoking an oil spill. The 
average probability takes into account the percentage of tankers with double hulls and their reduced 
susceptibility to loss of cargo. 
From the data available, it appears that the average tanker travelling from Novorossiysk to Augusta 
is a Suezmax class tanker with a size of 145’000 dwt. Given there is an oil spill due to a collision or 
grounding, the likelihoods of different quantities of oil being released are shown in Table 4. 
                                                 
4 [19] 
5 [19] 
6 [20]   10 
Probability of Spill Size (tonnes)  Type of 







Collision  0.65  0.22  0.07  0.05  0.01 
Grounding  0.68  0.24  0.05  0.02  0.02 
Table 4. Spill size probability for 145’000 tanker
7 
Values for Average and Worst Case scenario incident probabilities are calculated for each of the 
selected sites per tanker passage. In the next section, the (cargo loss and cleanup) costs related to 
these probabilities are combined with them in a consistent way in order to evaluate the risk an 
expected cost per passage.  
 
   Collision 
Collision 
+ Spill  Grounding 
Grounding 
+ Spill  Total 
Novorossiysk 
Average  2.57E-04  7.03E-05  4.33E-04  1.62E-04  2.49E-04 
Worst Case  5.14E-06  1.41E-06  8.66E-06  3.25E-06  3.28E-06 
Turkish Straits 
Average  2.84E-04  7.77E-05  1.68E-03  6.30E-04  7.43E-04 
Worst Case  5.68E-06  1.55E-06  3.36E-05  1.26E-05  8.31E-06 
Aegean Sea 
Average  2.38E-04  6.51E-05  3.64E-04  1.36E-04  2.16E-04 
Worst Case  4.76E-06  1.30E-06  7.28E-06  2.73E-06  2.90E-06 
Augusta 
Average  2.57E-04  7.03E-05  2.70E-04  1.01E-04  1.85E-04 
Worst Case  5.14E-06  1.41E-06  5.40E-06  2.02E-06  2.65E-06 
Table 5. Grounding and collision spill probabilities 
 
The average spill size for a tanker collision is found to be 8175 tonnes. The equivalent for a spill 
caused by grounding is 6790 tonnes
8. In 2% of grounding spills and 1% of collision spills, the 
outflow will be of a “Worst Case Scenario” variety.  
From Table 5, it follows that, along the whole route, the probability of an Average size spill is 
1.39E-3, while the probability of a Worst Case spill is 1.71E-5. 
                                                 
7 [20] 
8 Average grounding oil spill size = 500* 0.68 + 5,000*0.24 + 25’000*0.05 + 75’000*0.02 +125’000*0.02  = 6790 
tonnes. Average collision oil spill size =500* 0.65 + 5,000*0.22 + 25’000*0.07 + 75’000*0.05 +125’000*0.01  = 8175 
tonnes   11 
3.3. Stage 3. Distribution of Oil in the Environment, Environmental and 
Economic Effects 
 
The European average cleanup cost per tonne of crude oil spilt is $10’800. This value was then 
adjusted using a modification factor again based on the physical characteristics of the environment 
and  the  gravity  of  the  impact  an  oil  spill  could  have  on  them.  The  weightings  (Table  7)  vary 
significantly depending on factors such as type and quantity of oil, location type, environmental 
sensitivity, economic use and the response capabilities on site. These weighting factors and the 
cleanup costs per tonne are listed in Table 8.  
Combining weighting factors, cleanup cost per tonne and the quantity of oil spilt respectively in case 
of grounding and collision, yields the total cleanup costs for Worst Case Scenario and Average size 
spills in the different locations listed the third and sixth column of Table 9. 
 
The cost of lost revenue is computed taking an arbitrary value of $50 per barrel ($370/tonne). For 
Average  size  spills,  this  equates  to  $630’850  in  case  of  collision  and  to  $518’000  in  case  of 
grounding. For the Worst Case Scenario (the spill size is independent from the cause in this case) the 
loss in revenue rises to 48.1 million. The total cost to the carrier is the sum of the cleanup costs and 
the loss in revenue. 
The costs computed in this section will be then used in Section 4, where expected costs will be 
computed as the product of the probability of occurrence and its monetised consequences at each 
location
9 and then summed over the whole route.  
3.3.1. Modification Factors 
The cleanup cost are based on the European average cost of $10’800 per tonne
10 spilt.
11 This has 
been adjusted by the following modification factors which were calculated using previous oil spill 
statistics. The ratings given are based on data available on the sites under scrutiny. 
·  Oil Type. This is the factor by which different types of oil affect the spill cost. Cleanup costs 
for lighter crude and refined oils tend to be below the average spill cleanup cost. Heavier 
crude and fuel oils, as well as emulsions, are considerably more persistent and viscous. These 
oils  are  difficult  to  clean  up  using  dispersants,  skimmers  and  pumps,  resulting  in 
                                                 
9 To anticipate, for revenue loss this is dealt with in section 4.2, while for cleanup costs, this is shown in Table 9. 
10 This assumption is likely to be too high, especially for a spill in the Russian Black Sea; however more precise data 
was not available at the time of writing. 
11 [23]   12 
considerably higher cleanup costs
12. Typically only 10 – 20% of spilled oil is contained and 
recovered.
13  
·  Spill Size. As Figure 2 demonstrates, the cost of a spill does not increase linearly with the 
size of the spill. Obviously a larger spill costs more to clean up than a smaller one, but there 
is a maximum cost per tonne which occurs at around 7 tonnes, after which the cost of dealing 
with the extra oil diminishes.  
Figure 2. Spill unit cleanup cost (1 gallon = 0.0032 tonnes)
14 
Table 6 show the shares of different oil types by spill size. As the average spill size is greater than 
700 tonnes we shall assume that 75% of the cargo is crude oil and the other 25% is refined products. 
 
%  Bunkers  Crude Oil  Refinery 
Products 
Other 
< 7 tonnes  22  51  15.7  11.3 
7 – 700 tonnes  8  44  34.7  13.3 
> 700 tonnes  3.6  67.8  25  3.6 
Table 6. Oil spill sizes by oil type
15 
·  Location Type. This factor accounts for whether the spill is found near a shoreline or in a 
port. 




15 [22]   13 
·  Area Sensitivity. Here the presence of national parks, areas of specific ecological interest are 
accounted for as a potential to experience long term damage (months to years). 
·  Preparedness. This factor takes into consideration the availability of cleanup equipment and 
personnel etc. and their efficiency (effective oil cleanup). 
·  Response Time. The time taken for a cleanup operation to commence. 
·  Human Use. The presence of habitations or economic activity (fishing/tourism) on the site 
and their potential to experience long term damage. 
·  Weather. Previous spills
16 have shown that weather can be counted as neutral as it either 
helps to naturally disperse the oil or hinders cleanup. 
 
Table 7 shows the modification factors by which the spill cost/tonne should be adjusted for Average 
and  Worst  Case  Scenarios  for  each  location.  In  Table  8  the  weightings  are  multiplied  with the 
European cost per tonne ($10’807.83)
17 of the Average and Worst Case Scenario to give the cleanup 
cost per tonne of such a spill. 
                                                 
16 The Braer spill in the Shetland Islands was one of the largest spills ever. Bad weather prevented a major retrieval 
operation from being put into effect through ultimately this same bad weather dispersed the spill to such an extent that 
major environmental damage was avoided. 
17 $ = US Dollar = € 0.8211 (21/09/2005)   14 
 
  Weighting 









Time  Preparedness  Human 
Use  Total 
Novorossiysk 
Average  0.5675  0.27  1.28  1.2  0.8  1.15  1  0.2165253 
Worst Case  0.65  0.01  1.28  1.2  0.8  1.15  1  0.0091852 
Turkish Straits 
Average  0.5675  0.27  1.46  3.8  0.8  1.15  3  2.3462547 
Worst Case  0.65  0.01  1.46  3.8  0.8  1.15  3  0.0995311 
Aegean Sea 
Average  0.5675  0.27  0.46  3.2  0.97  1  1.7  0.3719273 
Worst Case  0.65  0.01  0.46  3.2  0.97  1  1.7  0.0157776 
Augusta 
Average  0.5675  0.27  1.28  1.2  1.15  1  1  0.2706566 
Worst Case  0.65  0.01  1.28  1.2  1.15  1  1  0.0114816 
Table 7. Weightings for Average and Worst Case spill scenarios 
   Weighting  Cost/tonne 
Novorossiysk 
Average  0.216  2338.47337 
Worst Case  0.009  99.201024 
Turkish Straits 
Average  2.346  25339.55128 
Worst Case  0.099  1074.936096 
Aegean Sea 
Average  0.372  4016.815194 
Worst Case  0.015  170.3984256 
Augusta 
Average  0.271  2923.091712 
Worst Case  0.011  124.00128 
Table 8. cleanup costs for Average and Worst Case spill scenarios.   15 
4. Results 
4.1 Inherent risk 
The expected damage, or “risk” can be defined as the expected unwanted consequences. Here the 
unwanted consequences for the carrier are the probable costs that would have to be paid for cleanup 
and  loss  of  revenue.  In  this  analysis  the  risk  will  be  taken  as  product  of  the  calculated  spill 








1             (6) 
where P = Probability of a spill, D = damage cost and i = the site being assessed. The risk for the 
whole route (M) is the sum of these component risks. 
Values for Average and Worst Case scenario incident probabilities are here calculated for each of 
the selected sites per tanker passage, along with the consequent costs. The risk is then evaluated as 
an expected cost per passage. 
 
4.2. Loss in Revenue 
When thinking about the total cost of a spill, the cost of the oil lost must also be taken into account. 
Due to the highly fluctuating oil prices, an arbitrary value of $50 per barrel ($370/tonne) was used to 
calculate loss in revenue.  
 
Average loss in revenue Collision   = 8175 * 370  = $3’024’750     (7) 
 
Average loss in revenue Grounding   = 6790 * 370= $2’512’300      (8) 
 
Worst case scenario loss in Revenue = 130’000 * 370= $48’100’000    (9) 
 
4.3. Total Cost 
Total Average and Worst Case Scenario costs can be calculated for each location. 
For example, if there was a Worst Case Scenario spill in the Bosphorus then the total cost would be 
the sum of the cleanup cost and the loss in revenue: 
Total Cost   = 48’100’000 + 140’000’000  = $188’100’000    (10) 
   16 
4.4. Risk 
The risk calculated here is the risk for the carrier, which is different than the risk for society. Carriers 
are  only  likely  to  be  liable  for  cleanup  and  lost  revenue  costs.  The  risk  is  the  product  of  the 
probability of occurrence and their monetised consequences. The tables below show the monetised 
risk per transit for grounding and collision per location in US dollars. 
The cleanup risk would be the amount a tanker should expect to pay in remediation of the damages 
due to an oil spill caused by grounding or collision at each location. 
   Grounding  Collision 
   Probability  Cost ($)  Expected Cost ($)  Probability  Cost ($)  Expected Cost ($) 
Novorossiysk 
Average  1,62E-04  1,59E+07  2,57E+03  7,03E-05  1,91E+07  1,34E+03 
Worst 
case  3,25E-06  1,29E+07  4,19E+01  1,41E-06  1,29E+07  1,81E+01 
Turkish Straits 
Average  6,30E-04  1,72E+08  1,08E+05  7,77E-05  2,07E+08  1,61E+04 
Worst 
case  1,26E-05  1,40E+08  1,76E+03  1,55E-06  1,40E+08  2,17E+02 
Aegean Sea 
Average  1,36E-04  2,73E+07  3,71E+03  6,51E-05  3,28E+07  2,14E+03 
Worst 
case  2,73E-06  2,22E+07  6,04E+01  1,30E-06  2,22E+07  2,89E+01 
Augusta 
Average  1,01E-04  1,98E+07  2,00E+03  7,03E-05  2,39E+07  1,68E+03 
Worst 
case  2,02E-06  1,61E+07  3,26E+01  1,41E-06  1,61E+07  2,27E+01 
Table 9. Expected cleanup costs for oil spills caused by groundings and collisions 
 
The total cleanup expected cost is the sum of the grounding and collision clanup expected costs. 
Figure 3 shows the expected cleanup costs of the Average and Worst Case Scenario spills for each 
site. 

















Figure 3. Expected cleanup costs for oil spills caused by groundings and collisions 
 
The expected loss in revenue for an Average size spill is
18 1.39E-3 * 2’778’015 = $3861. The 
expected loss in revenue for a Worst Case Scenario spill = 1.71E-5 * 48’100’000 = $822. 
The  total  expected  costs  under  the  two  scenarios,  for  a  tanker  travelling  from  Novorossiysk  to 
Augusta due to a collision or grounding is the sum of the expected loss in revenue due to the loss of 
cargo and the expected cleanup costs for grounding and collision: 
 
Total Route Expected Cost(Average spill) =  
3916 + 124’491+5847 + 3685 +3861  = $141’800      (11) 
 
Total Route Expected Cost (Worst Case Scenario) =  
6.00E+01 + 1.98E+03 +8.93E+01 + 5.53E+01 + 822 = 2’202.        (12) 
 
4.5. Discussion 
Using the professional judgement risk equivalence values from the table below, we can say that there 
is a “high” to “very high” risk of a spill occurring along this route(~1.0E-3 – 1.0E-4), and a medium 
                                                 
18 The revenue loss figure of $2’778’015 is computed as a weighted average of the figures computed in (7) and (8) for 
average size spills. The weights (approximately 0.481 for grounding and 0.519 for collision) are derived by comparing  
the relative shares of these events as accident causes.   18 
risk of a Worst Case Scenario accident (~1.0E-6). This is corroborated by the data on previous 
tanker spills in the Black Sea and Mediterranean areas. 
 
Rating Categories   Probability of Occurrence   Professional  Judgment  on 
Risk  Equivalence-  Chance 
That Spill Will Occur  
Will never occur  None  Zero 
Very low or no risk  Rarely if Ever occurs  1X10
-9  
Low  Unlikely to occur  1X10
-7 
Medium  May occur  1X10
-6 
High  Likely to occur  1X10
-4 
Very High  Most likely to occur  1X10
-3 
Table 10. Professional judgement risk categories
19 
Unsurprisingly  given  their  special  nature  and  location,  the  Turkish  Straits  have  the  highest 
probability of a spill occurring along with the gravest consequences. In fact, the Turkish Straits 
account for over 70% of the risk of an oil spill along the route. This, and the fact that a major spill is 
likely to occur due to a collision, is borne out by previous spill data – two of the largest spills on 
record, the Independenta and the Nassia were both caused by collisions in the Bosphorus. 
4.5.1. Comparison of spill costs 
It is interesting to look at how the spill costs compare to other historical spills. The Exxon Valdez 
tanker disaster which happened off the coast of Alaska in 1989, spilling 35’000 tonnes of oil, had a 
cleanup cost of roughly $2 billion
20 ($2.73 billion in today’s money when adjusted for inflation).  
A Worst Case Scenario spill in the Bosphorus where 130’000 tonnes of oil are lost would have a 
calculated cleanup cost of $0.14 billion. 
There is an order of magnitude difference in the two cleanup costs which can only partially be 
explained, and this despite the higher spill volume in the case of the Bosphorus. One factor not taken 
into account is the higher base per-unit oil spill cleanup costs in North America ($19’814.63). This is 
roughly twice that of Europe ($10’807.83). A probable discrepancy arises from the incompleteness 
of the weighting system. The data comes from the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
was meant to be used for mapping out oil spill risks in US waters. As the Bosphorus Strait is unique 
in that it has very high tanker density, passes through the centre of Istanbul, and is difficult to 
navigate, it is reasonable to assume that the EPA weighting factors do not take these circumstances 
into  account  with  sufficient  emphasis.  Unfortunately,  cleanup  data  for  actual  accidents  in  the 
Bosphorus is not available. 
                                                 
19 [3] 
20 [26]   19 
5. Conclusions 
The route analysed appears to be a risky one: in terms of professional judgement risk equivalence 
values used in a similar context by Hildrew (2001), we can say that there is a “high” to “very high” 
risk of a spill occurring along this route(~1.0E-3 – 1.0E-4), and a medium risk of a Worst Case 
Scenario accident (~1.0E-6). This is corroborated by the data on previous tanker spills in the Black 
Sea and Mediterranean areas. 
The total cost of transporting a Suezmax tanker load of crude oil from Novorossiysk to Augusta is in 
the order of $1’200’000
21. Therefore, the expected cleanup cost per passage due to tanker collisions 
and groundings ($141’800) represents approximately 11,8% of the total cost. This cost can in a sense 
be regarded as a lower bound for the premium an insurance company should charge to insure each 
tanker passage along the route against cleanup and loss of revenue due to spills caused by collisions 
and groundings. 
It is quite conclusive from the results that the Turkish Straits are the major danger point along the 
route, both in terms of occurrence probability and spill impact. However it is interesting to note that 
there is no obvious hierarchy amongst the other sites. The fact that, for example, Novorossiysk has a 
comparatively high spill occurrence probability yet a comparatively low impact, should, in principle, 
provide  reliable  guidance  to  decision  makers  when  considering  investments  into  either  spill 
prevention or spill response programs. 
The costs for cleanups and revenue losses due to tanker accidents are enormous, running into billions 
of dollars in Worst Case scenarios. There have been huge improvements in tanker safety in the last 
decade or so, as oil carriers realise that it is in their own interest as much as the public to avoid such 
accidents  as  far  as  possible.  As  engineering  standards  improve,  so  the  rate  of  accidents  should 
decrease. The analysis initiated with this paper can help making rational decisions about where 
future investments into oil transit safety and further regulations from national and supra-national 
authorities should be focused.  
The analysis is currently being extended. Our research agenda includes the following issues:  
·  Refining the methodology: extend to other accident causes, anchor spill probabilities on more 
recent data, create weightings from European spill statistics, use more accurate European 
data for specific cleanup costs, factor in technology developments for spill prevention and 
cleanup; 
·  Extending the coverage of the evaluation exercise: diversify by actual spill and tanker size, 
apply the methodology to other tanker routes, adapt and apply the methodology to pipelines; 
                                                 
21 [5]   20 
·  Extending the  scope  of  the  evaluation  exercise:  include  impacts  on  the  environment  and 
socioeconomic activities, include risk aversion, apply benefit transfer methodology for the 
evaluation of non-monetized impacts. 
We expect the impact of these developments to be considerable. By way of illustration, consider that 
back-of-the-envelope application of benefit transfer methodology indicates a willingness to pay for 
Istanbul  inhabitants  up  to  400  million  dollars,  in  order  to  avoid  an  Average  size  spill  in  the 
Bosphorus.   21 
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